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many organizations deal with the copyright doctrine of "works for hire" whether they know it or not. When a 
bank has an employee write a computer 
program, for example, the program is a 
work for hire. When a business contracts 
with a newspaper for the newspaper to 
create an advertisement, the ad may (or 
may not) be a work for hire. When a 
store contracts with a graphic designer 
to produce a catalog, the catalog may 
similarly be a work for hire. 
Most of these arrangements, of 
course, will not give rise to litigation. 
When they do, special problems ensue 
because courts have not agreed on two 
key points about works for hire: the 
interpretation of the term "employment" 
in the Copyright Act, and on the differ-
ence between an "employment" relation-
ship and a relationship in which a copy-
rightable work is created on "special 
order or commission." 
As of the date of this writing, a writ of 
certiorari has been granted by the Su-
preme Court in a work-for-hire case,' 
but however the issues are resolved, 
lawyers representing businesses that 
use the creative talents of free-lancer 
artists and designers, or who represent 
the artists and designers themselves, 
will want to understand those issues 
right now and know what to do to mini-
mize the risk of litigation. 
What difference does it make 
whether something is a work for 
hire? 
The status of a work as "for hire" or 
not determines three things: (1) who is 
the initial owner in the absence of a 
contractual agreement. A work for hire 
belongs to the hiring party. A work not 
for hire belongs to the work's creator. 2 
(2) whether the creator can terminate 
a license. If a work is not "for hire," the 
author or the work or the author's heirs  
can, between 35 and 40 years after a 
license or transfer or rights is executed ; 
 terminate the license or transfer. The 
author or heirs, in other words, can get 
the copyright back and there is nothing 
either party can do to waive this "
termination" right. If a work is "for hire," then 
no one has any termination right. Once 
the rights to a work for hire are sold, 
they are gone for good. 3  
(3) what is the duration of a copyright. 
The normal term of a copyright is for the 
life of the author plus an additional 50 
years after the author's death. When a 
work is made "for hire," however, the 
term is not life plus 50, but either 75 
years from the year the work was first 
published, or 100 years from the year of 
the work's creation, whichever is less.' 
What is a "work for hire?" 
Here's what the Copyright Act says: 
A "work made for hire" is either 
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(1) a work prepared by an em-
ployee within the scope of his or 
her employment; or 
(2) a work specially ordered or 
commissioned for use as a contri-
bution to a collective work, as a 
part of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, as a translation, 
as a supplemental work, as a com-
pilation, as an instructional text, as 
a test, as answer material for a 
test, or as an atlas, if the parties 
expressly agree in a written instru-
ment signed by them that the work 
shall be considered a work made 
for hire. 5 
Notice that there are two provisions: 
one for works created by an employee, 
and one for works created on "special 
order for commission." Some things 
about these two provisions will not be 
apparent on first inspection. For exam-
ple: 
1. Pre-existing works cannot be "for 
hire" despite the parties' agreement. 
Other than in the limited circum-
stances of the second provision (works 
created "on special order or commis-
sion"), the parties to a contractual agree-
ment cannot turn a work that is not "for 
hire" into one that is. For example, 
unless the hiring party is in some way 
the motivating force behind a work's 
creation, the work cannot be "for hire." 
In other words, if there is no pre-exist-
ing relationship between a work's cre-
ator and a party who later buys the 
work, the work cannot be "for hire." 
2. "Works for hire" cannot be anything 
else despite the parties' agreement. 
A "work made for hire" cannot be 
anything else regardless of the parties' 
agreement. If the parties are in an em-
ployment relationship, and the employee 
creates something within the scope of 
employment, the result is a work for 
hire. The parties can sign a written 
agreement that the employee, not the 
employer, will own the copyright to any 
works the employee creates, but that 
will not change the fact that the works 
are "for hire." 
3. Specially ordered or commissioned 
works must meet three requirements to be 
"for hire." 
The second relationship, for works 
made "on special order or commission," 
sets out three requirements: 
(a) that a work be made "on special 
order or commission"; (b) that the work 
fit into one of the categories listed in the 
Act (a contribution to a collective work, a 
part of a motion picture, etc.); and (c) 
that the parties sign a writing expressing 
their understanding that the hired party's 
works will be "for hire." 
Outside of employment relationships, 
the only way a work can be considered 
"for hire" is if it meets all three of the 
commissioned work tests. If, for exam-
ple, the parties to a "special order or 
commission" relationship do not agree in 
writing that their works will be "for 
hire," the works cannot be "for hire." If 
the works do not fall into one of the listed 
categories, then they cannot be "for 
hire" even if the parties do sign an 
agreement that they should. 
What are the problems in interpret-
ing "employment" and "commis-
sioning" relationships? 
The primary legal problem with works 
created for hire is that courts have not 
agreed on what "employment" means, 
or on the significance of the dividing line 
between "employment" and "special or-
der and commission." At one time or 
another, courts have stated or implied 
four different interpretations of "employ-
ment": 
a) Employment means regular, sala-
ried, "formal" employment. In BPI Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Leith, 7 for example, a de-
veloper of computer software contracted 
with an independent computer program-
mer to write some computer programs. 
The programmer wrote the programs 
and delivered them, but later began sell-
ing very similar programs on his own, in 
competition with the developer who had 
hired him. In the resulting dispute over 
copyright ownership, the court found 
that there was no employment relation-
ship between the two, noting that the 
programmer had performed the work at 
his own "place of business on his own 
computers. He was paid per program 
and no social security or income tax was 
deducted from his pay." The court 
seemed to equate "employment" with 
regular salaried employment. 
b) Employment is defined by the tort 
law test of vicarious liability, determined 
by asking whether the hiring party not 
only had the right to direct and control  
the work of the hired party, but actually 
did control that party. In a second circuit 
case, Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, 
Inc., 9 an importer contracted with a for-
eign ceramics firm to design and produce 
small ceramic figurines, which it did. 
Another American firm copied and sold 
similar figurines. The importer sued the 
competitor, who defended on the 
grounds that the figurines were created 
by the foreign firm, were not "for hire," 
and that therefore the importer had no 
standing to assert ownership rights. 
The Second Circuit decided in favor of 
the importer, finding that the importer's 
representative had "actively supervised 
and directed the work step by step," 
hence was an "employer" for copyright 
purposes and therefore the owner. 10 
c) Employment is determined by ask-
ing whether the hiring party actually 
controlled, or at least had the right to 
control the work of the hired party. 
When a town asked a volunteer to pre-
pare a manual for operation of its juvenile 
justice system, for example, the town 
was found to have had the right to direct 
the writing of the manual even though in 
practice an independent consultant had 
written almost all of it. Result: the town 
was the owner of a work for hire. Clark-
stown v. Reeder. 11 
d) Employment simply means that one 
party has hired another to create a work. 
In a Fifth Circuit case, Murray v. Gelder-
man, 12 for example, an organization 
hired an author to write a cookbook. The 
author expressly bargained for the right 
to control all details of the book's presen-
tation. Yet the court found that the hiring 
organization was still an "employer" for 
copyright purposes, primarily because 
(Continued) 
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the book had been created at its instance 
and expense—in other words, the orga-
nization had hired somebody. 
The definition of "employment" has 
thus varied widely; it remains the central 
unresolved issue in work-for-hire law 
today. 
A second and related problem is judi-
cial confusion over whether the "employ-
ment" and "on special order or commis-
sion" provisions are mutually exclusive, 
or must be examined one after the other. 
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One view is that Congress meant 
them to be exclusive: a work is either 
made by an employee, or it is made on 
special order or commission, but not 
both. Some courts have implied this 
conclusion. BPI Systems, Inc. v. Leith, 13 
the case involving the computer pro-
grammer for example, suggested the 
mutually exclusive nature of the two 
provisions by observing that "Defendant 
was not an employee. . . The work he 
did was specially ordered and commis-
sioned. "14 
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Nevertheless, several courts have 
first determined that a work was "com-
missioned," but then gone on to ask 
whether the creator of the work was also 
an "employee. " 15 Some courts have 
even concluded that a work cannot be 
"commissioned" because it does not fit 
into one of the listed categories of 
commisioned works, or the parties made no 
written agreement. 16 The statute seems 
to say, in contrast to this approach, that 
the two conditions—fitting into the listed 
categories of commissioned works and 
the presence of a writing—determine 
whether a commissioned work can be 
"for hire," not whether a work can be 
considered "commissioned" in the first 
place. 
What to watch out for in 
work-for-hire situati ns 
Relatively few disputes arise from sit-
uations of regular, salaried employment. 
The hard cases arise when one party 
hires another not as a salaried employee, 
but under a limited contract. 
Unexpected use of works is the 
problem 
Businesses make these sorts of con-
tracts with other businesses or free-
lancers to do copyrightable work all the 
time: for brochures, advertising, corpo-
rate reports, fabric designs, blueprints, 
posters and on and on. Usually the par-
ties to these agreements have a certain 
use in mind for the works to be created. 
As long as the hiring party does with the 
work only what it was planning to do and 
what the freelancer thought was going to 
be done, there will seldom be a problem. 
But if the hiring party later decides to 
make some other, unforeseen, unbar-
gained for use of the work, that's when 
work-for-hire litigation arises. 
Obviously the thing to do is get these 
situations covered by a written contract. 
Even if you cannot change the status of a 
work as "for hire" or not, you can be 
sure who gets ownership rights by ar-
ranging for a transfer of rights and by 
expressly noting the nature of the 
rights. 17 In any event, the most impor-
tant thing for both sides is to have the 
contract say explicitly who will be the 
owner of all rights not otherwise enumer-
ated in the contract or contemplated 
ahead of time. 
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Copyright and the statute of frauds 
The Copyright Act has a statute of 
frauds provision. If you rely on a transfer 
(assignment, license, etc.) of exclusive 
rights to avoid any questions of work-
for-hire ownership, the transfer must be 
in writing and signed by the transferor. 18 
Nonexclusive transfers may be oral. Re-
member, though, that a contract trans-
ferring copyright rights does change the 
status of a work as "for hire" or not-it 
just says who the owner of the work will 
be. 
The Copyright Act divides the world 
of works for hire into two kinds: those 
created by employees, and those on 
special order or commission. Unfortu-
nately, neither the Act nor the legislative 
history defines those relationships, or 
makes clear the boundaries between 
them. 
The parties to a contract for the cre-
ation of copyrightable works cannot 
modify the status of a work as being "for  
hire" or not, but they can-and should-
spell out their understanding with regard 
to the ownership of any works created. 
In particular, they should expressly allo-
cate ownership rights not only for the 
uses of the works that both parties 
contemplate, but also ownership rights 
for all uses not otherwise specified in the 
contract. 
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FOOTNOTES Contracts and subcontracts 
Even an iron-clad contract leaves 
room for problems. Take this situation: 
the ACME company hires an advertising 
agency to create a magazine advertise-
ment. ACME includes a clause in the ad 
agency contract making ACME the 
copyright owner by an express transfer 
of rights. The ad agency then subcon-
tracts out some art work to a freelance 
artist and fails to say anything about 
copyright rights to the artist. ACME 
gets the ad from the agency and likes the 
resulting artwork so much that it uses it 
in promotional brochures as well as the 
magazine campaign. The subcontracting 
artist then sues ACME over this unex-
pected use of the artwork. 
The outcome is far from certain, given 
the split of views among the circuits, the 
artist might well win despite ACME's 
expectations otherwise: the artist did 
not sign a writing about works for hire, 
nor are "art works for advertising" listed 
in the list of commissioned works that 
can be "for hire," nor is the artist a 
regular, salaried employee of the ad 
agency or ACME. To avoid this possibili-
ty, ACME should get a requirement in 
the original contract with the ad agency 
that the agency will insist on copyright 
transfers from all subcontractors and 
subs of subcontractors, with an indemni-
ty clause if it fails to do so. 
Summary 
Works for hire belong initially to the 
hiring party. Their copyright lasts for 75 
years from publication or 100 years from 
creation, whichever is less. Once the 
rights to a work for hire are transferred, 
the transfer cannot later be revoked 
under the Act's "termination" provision 
1. Community for Creative Non-Violence 
v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), 
petition for cert. filed, Docket No. 88-293 (1-
17-88); cert. granted November 7, 1988. 
2. 17 U.S.C. section 201(a) & (b). 
3. 17 U.S.C. section 203. 
4. 17 U.S.C. section 302(a) & (c). 
5. 17 U.S.C. section 101. 
6. 17 U.S.C. section 201(b)(by implica-
tion). 
7. 532 F.Supp. 208 (W.D. Tx. 1981). 
8. 532 F.532 F. Supp. at 210. For similar 
conclusions, see Mister B. Textiles, Inc. v. 
Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21 
(S.D.N.Y. 2982) and Meltzer v. Chirgotis, 
520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981). 
9. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984). 
10. 738 F. 2d at 550. See also Brunswick 
Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing 
Co., 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987), and Evans 
Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software, 
793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1986). 
11. 566 F. Supp 137 (S. D. N. Y. 1983). 
12. 566 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1978). The 
fifth circuit itself has recently repudiated this 
position. See Easter Seal Society v. Playboy 
Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987). 
13. 532 F.Supp. 208 (W.D. Tex. 1981). 
14. 532 F.Supp. at 210 
15. See Sandwiches, Inc. v. Wendy's Inter-
national, Copyright Law Decisions 26,085 at 
p. 20,993. 
16. See, e.g., Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, 
Miller, P.C. v. Empire Construction Co., 542 
F. Supp 252 (D.Nebr. 1982). 
17. Outright transfers of an entire copy-
right, once the norm in many industries, are 
viewed with increasing suspicion by freelance 
artists, photographers, etc. There is a grow-
ing tendency to insist on a limited license 
defining where, how, and in how many copies 
a work will be reproduced. 
18. 17 U.S.C. section 204, See also the 
definition of "transfer" in section 101. 
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